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General

The paper suffers from a lack of a "global" point of view; i.e., it fails to relate the problem of withdrawal to the larger strategy of Soviet foreign policy. This can probably be repaired only through substantial re-writing.

It would be more useful if conclusions were drawn after the consideration of each possibility, as well as at the end of the paper.

The use of the outline form of presentation obscures, rather than aids, the discussion.

Specific lacks

(1) It is concluded without discussion that Russia would not make such an announcement of withdrawal before UNGA because of its earlier attitude on the competence of the UN in the question. On this matter there should be both a discussion of advantages and disadvantages to the Russian position, with the above conclusion if still valid. G/IO should concur in this.

(2) There is no discussion of the advantages and disadvantages (both to USSR and the West) of an actual quadripartite withdrawal. (The paper's assumption that such a proposal would be made for propaganda purposes only should be supported.) This should be followed by conclusions as to its likelihood.

Scope

Logical completeness would seem to demand this treatment:

three major possibilities: quadripartite withdrawal or unilateral withdrawal from Germany or quadripartite withdrawal from Berlin

under each: possibility of proposal or actual withdrawal

in each instance: a discussion of ^{consequences, favorable} advantages, disadvantages, ^{and unfavorable,} consequences and conclusions.

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